Unity, Independence, and Polemics within the Argentine Left Under Milei
Navigating the United Front
Milei’s presidency is putting the left in Argentina under immense pressure. The dispute between two major Trotskyist currents (see here) reflects a specific challenge for building united fronts in Argentina: the existence of Peronist organisations that talk left but act right. To understand the debate, we checked out the Fourth Internationalist groups, Corriente Marabunta [which writes extensively] and Democracia Socialista [which publishes less, as it is part of the Poder Popular regroupment].
The Crucible of Crisis: The Imperative for Unity Under Milei
The political landscape of Argentina has undergone a profound transformation with the ascent of Javier Milei to the presidency. His administration, inaugurated on December 10, 2023, represents a significant shift towards the far-right, characterized by radical economic policies and a staunch anti-socialist, anti-state ideology. Milei, an self-proclaimed "anarcho-capitalist," "libertarian anti-communist," and "pro-market" advocate, views the state as a "fundamental evil." His victory, likened to those of Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, signaled a decisive rejection of traditional political establishments.
Upon assuming office, Milei wasted no time in implementing drastic measures, often referred to as "chainsaw economics." These policies include slashing government spending by a third, dissolving and merging numerous ministries, freezing public works, and devaluing the peso by over 50%. The immediate social consequences have been severe, with poverty soaring to 53% within six months, the highest in 30 years, and an additional 5.5 million Argentines falling into poverty. While some polls in 2025 indicated a slight decrease in poverty to 38% and a 50-55% approval rating for Milei due to perceived deregulation benefits, the initial impact on consumption, investment, and public anger has been substantial, leading to frequent protests. This context underscores the severity of the threat perceived by left-wing forces, who face a government actively dismantling public services, social programs, and challenging established democratic norms.
In response to this aggressive right-wing offensive, united front strategies have become critically important for the Argentine left. These strategies aim to consolidate resistance across diverse political tendencies to confront common threats and advance working-class interests. The radical, anti-socialist, and economically devastating policies of the Milei government represent an existential threat to the social gains and future prospects of the working class and popular movements. The severity and ideological nature of Milei's attacks, coupled with his alignment with global far-right figures, directly necessitate and intensify the imperative for broad unity among left forces. This is not merely a political disagreement but a perceived fundamental challenge to the very fabric of social justice and collective welfare.
This high-stakes environment forces the left to confront its internal divisions more acutely. The immense pressure to unite against a powerful common enemy can either compel tactical compromises for broader strength or, conversely, exacerbate ideological purity tests, depending on how different factions perceive the immediate threat versus their long-term strategic goals. This dynamic sets the crucial stage for understanding the polemics and strategic divergences between groups like the PTS and MST, as well as the approach of Corriente Marabunta.
Corriente Marabunta explicitly advocates for broad unity against common threats, such as the Milei administration, emphasizing the necessity of "unity in action" while rigorously upholding political and organizational independence. Its recent affiliation with the Fourth International significantly informs its internationalist and revolutionary strategic outlook, providing a robust theoretical framework for navigating the inherent tensions of united front politics.
Navigating the Tensions: Independence, Debate, and Strategy
Corriente Marabunta positions itself as a "Corriente Social y Política" (Social and Political Current) deeply committed to fundamental societal transformation. Its core ideology is rooted in the pursuit of a "new world" founded on the principles of "socialism," "feminism," and "ecosocialism." The overarching objective of the movement is to foster "popular power, from below and to the left," with the ultimate aim of achieving a "social revolution." This vision is not merely theoretical; it is animated by a "historical search" for collective interests and the means of production, drawing inspiration from past struggles and acknowledging previous defeats. Marabunta explicitly references significant historical movements in Argentina, such as the "Cordobazo" and the piquetero movements of 2001, as foundational experiences that inform their contemporary activism.
A crucial development for Corriente Marabunta, which provides a significant theoretical and historical grounding for its approach to revolutionary politics, is its recent incorporation as a section of the Fourth International. This affiliation, as stated by Marabunta, "invites us to deepen our internationalist conception." This connection to a global tradition of Marxist thought, particularly on the theory and practice of united fronts as developed by figures like Trotsky, implies a more sophisticated and historically informed approach to united front politics than might be immediately apparent. This specific theoretical grounding differentiates Marabunta's approach from other left groups in Argentina, including PTS and MST, even if they share common ultimate goals.
While consistently advocating for broad unity, Corriente Marabunta simultaneously places significant emphasis on maintaining "political independence" alongside collective organization and class solidarity as essential for achieving "conquests." This commitment underscores their dedication to preserving a distinct revolutionary program within broader alliances. Their stance is further illuminated by their explicit rejection of "comer sapos" (eating frogs), a colloquialism for making distasteful or unprincipled compromises to win elections. Instead, they prioritize taking "politics in our own hands" to construct a new society. This position establishes a clear boundary against opportunism, suggesting that unity is viewed as a tactical means to advance a revolutionary strategy, not an end in itself that justifies diluting core principles. Their call to "romper de manera intransigente con los que pusieron delante las banderas del feminismo y la justicia social para esconder las peores miserias propias del sistema" (intransigently break with those who put forward the banners of feminism and social justice to hide the worst miseries inherent in the system) indicates a clear line against perceived co-optation or opportunism by forces they deem part of the "regime."
This approach exemplifies Marabunta's active engagement with the core dilemma of revolutionary politics: how to build broad defensive unity against a common threat without compromising one's revolutionary principles or being absorbed by reformist or non-revolutionary forces. Their rejection of "eating frogs" signifies a conscious effort to balance the imperative for unity with the necessity of maintaining theoretical and practical purity. This internal dynamic suggests that Marabunta's participation in fronts like FIT-U is likely strategic and conditional. They would likely engage in principled debate within such fronts, prioritizing the revolutionary line, and potentially differentiating themselves or even withdrawing if tactical compromises threaten their long-term strategic goals, akin to how other revolutionary groups might hold separate events or issue distinct documents as an expression of independence.
Corriente Marabunta demonstrates a conscious awareness of the inherent pitfalls within internal left dynamics. In a 2024 article, they articulate the necessity to "aprender a convivir en la heterogeneidad de los espacios de base y conducir los procesos sin sectarismo para desarrollar la perspectiva de una revolución necesaria" (learn to coexist in the heterogeneity of grassroots spaces and lead processes without sectarianism to develop the perspective of a necessary revolution). This statement indicates a proactive effort to avoid sectarianism in their leadership of grassroots processes and to foster broad participation, recognizing that internal divisions can undermine revolutionary potential. Historical documents from their current, dating back to 1974-75, also refer to "sectarismo y listas para actuar en forma unida y solidaria" (sectarianism and lists to act in a united and solidary manner). This suggests a long-standing internal reflection on these issues within their tradition, highlighting a consistent concern with overcoming internal fragmentation to achieve effective collective action.
Corriente Marabunta clearly distinguishes between tactical engagement and long-term strategic objectives. Their emphasis on "unidad de acción" (unity in action) in street mobilizations and their assertion that "No hay tiempo para esperar al 2026" (There is no time to wait for 2026) suggest that united fronts are understood primarily as a tactic for immediate resistance and mobilization against the current government's policies. This aligns with the understanding of the united front as a flexible tactical tool to engage with broader layers of the working class and advance immediate struggles. However, this tactical engagement is explicitly framed within a broader, long-term strategy of building a "new society, feminista y socialista," where the working people are positioned to lead history. This demonstrates a clear differentiation between short-term tactical alliances, often for defensive purposes against severe attacks, and the overarching strategic goal of revolutionary transformation.
The concept of a "united front" has been an "essential part of Communist technique," where non-communist elements are invited to collaborate under a seemingly acceptable program. The historical pattern often shows that once power is attained and consolidated, the communist elements gradually eliminate their non-communist supporters, eventually establishing a dictatorship that deviates from the original program. This historical perspective highlights the inherent strategic tensions and potential for manipulation within united fronts, particularly when revolutionary and reformist tendencies converge. Argentina's own history offers a cautionary example in the "Unión Democrática" of 1946. This anti-Peronist coalition, which included the Radical Civic Union and socialists, ultimately failed to achieve its objectives due to internal opposition within the Radical Civic Union and disputes between socialists and progressive democrats over the vice-presidency. This historical precedent illustrates the long-standing challenges of forming broad democratic fronts in Argentina and the internal dynamics that can lead to their collapse, often due to struggles over leadership and programmatic differences.
Furthermore, the ideological transformation of Spanish and Portuguese Socialist Parties (PSOE and PS) in the mid-1970s provides another valuable historical lesson. These parties shifted from advocating "Socialism in freedom, rupture with capitalism," and "closer relations with the Communists" to practically accepting "liberal democracy" and rejecting collaboration with Communist parties. This trajectory illustrates how some democratic socialist parties have historically moved away from radical unity or revolutionary aims towards more reformist, mainstream political positions, a trend that informs contemporary debates on "opportunism" within the left.
These historical examples serve as a crucial cautionary tale regarding the inherent fragility and potential pitfalls of united fronts, especially when different strategic goals (e.g., revolutionary versus reformist, or even different revolutionary tendencies) are at play. The "Communist technique" of gradually eliminating non-communists or the internal fragmentation of Argentina's "Unión Democrática" underscore the persistent challenges of maintaining genuine unity and independence. The ideological shifts of European socialist parties demonstrate how "democratic socialist" forces can move away from radical unity or revolutionary aims. This historical context is vital for understanding the contemporary debates within the Argentine left. When the MST accuses the PTS of "electoralism" or "sectarianism," or when Marabunta emphasizes "independence," these accusations and principles are rooted in a long history of left-wing struggles over the very nature and purpose of alliances. The historical record suggests that the tension between unity and purity, or tactic and strategy, is a recurring and fundamental challenge for the left, not merely a contemporary squabble unique to Argentina.
How the Fourth Internationalists see the FIT-U
This discussion between the MST and PTS needs some context: they, and the bulk of the revolutionary left in Argentina, work together in the united left electoral front: the FIT-U. Marabuna and Poder Popular (the regroupment which Democracia Socialista has joined), the currents in Argentina linked to the Fourth International, have similar approaches towards the FIT-U.
Marabunta wants the "unity of the lefts" in the streets AND in elections. They focus on "popular power from below and from the left." Their actions and publications consistently emphasise the need to strengthen the FIT-U. A stronger, more cohesive, and more centralised structure for the anti-capitalist, socialist left in Argentina is needed to ensure the FIT-U isn't 'only' an electoral bloc but one that is contributing and leading in the extra-parliamentary struggle.
That's also the view of Poder Popular, which agrees that the FIT-U is the most consistent and anti-capitalist of the visible left alternatives in Argentina. For Poder Popular, FIT-U is not just an electoral front but a space for the strategic regrouping of the revolutionary left. Their participation within the FIT-U is predicated on this long-term objective, even as the specific path to achieving it involves internal debates and practical considerations within the coalition.
Case Study: The PTS-MST Polemic and its Implications for Left Unity
The ongoing polemic between the Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores (MST) and the Partido de los Trabajadores Socialistas (PTS) stands as a central case study illuminating the profound challenges inherent in united front tactics within the Argentine left. The core of this disagreement revolves around their divergent approaches to the March 24th mobilization, commemorating the 49th anniversary of the genocide in Argentina.
The MST vigorously advocated for and actively participated in a "unitary, independent, and massive demonstration" organized by human rights organizations in Plaza de Mayo. From the MST's perspective, this mobilization was a historic and positive event, particularly given the two decades of division that had plagued these marches. They viewed it as a crucial opportunity to strike a significant blow against the Milei government's "fascistoid project" and to invigorate popular resistance.
Conversely, the MST has accused the PTS and its allies (including PO, IS, and NMAS) of deliberately "sabotaging" this unitary call. The MST contends that the PTS attempted to divide the demonstration and "turned their backs on a massive show of force." Specifically, the MST alleges that the PTS falsely claimed the March 24th event was "subordinated to Peronism and the worst of the union bureaucracy" and that it would be "an act with Milani and Berni." The MST further criticizes the PTS for allegedly manipulating and falsifying facts, and for later opportunistically using photos of the massive Plaza event on their social media for electoral purposes, despite having actively campaigned against it.
The MST's critique of the PTS is multifaceted and deeply rooted in strategic disagreements. They level strong accusations, characterizing the PTS's actions regarding the March 24th mobilization as a "grave error" and "failed divisionism." The MST contends that the PTS engaged in "manipulating and falsifying facts" and later opportunistically utilized images from the massive demonstration for electoral ends, despite having actively campaigned against its unity.
A central tenet of the MST's argument is that the PTS "historically misunderstands" the fundamental Leninist principle of "unity in action." They accuse the PTS of a tendency towards "self-marginalizing due to sectarianism or attempting to divide what it cannot lead." This characterization aligns with theoretical definitions of sectarianism, which describe it as prioritizing purity of dogma over tactical advantage, finding fundamental differences in minor disagreements, or abstaining from actual mass struggle. The MST's portrayal of PTS's actions as undermining broad unity in action, particularly for narrow organizational or electoral gains, fits this definition of an "erroneous attitude to the class struggle."
Furthermore, the MST criticizes the PTS for holding a "conservative and electoralist conception" that, in their view, severely limits the potential of the Frente de Izquierda – Unidad (FIT-U). They accuse the PTS of "apparatusism," "forced hegemonism," and "electoralist calculation," citing instances where the PTS allegedly attempted to break FIT-U lists to prevent the MST from leading, despite prior agreements based on electoral results. The MST's own theoretical stance on "sectarianism" and "opportunism" is implicitly aligned with the general definitions provided by Marxist theorists, which describe sectarianism as prioritizing purity of dogma over tactical advantage and abstaining from mass struggle, and opportunism as adapting principles to circumstances for short-term gain. The MST's critique portrays the PTS as prioritizing its narrow organizational interests over broader class unity and effective mass mobilization.
This polemic vividly exemplifies the profound challenges of achieving and maintaining unity and independence within the Argentine left. It reveals a fundamental disagreement on the practical application of united front tactics, particularly concerning the delicate balance between achieving broad unity and maintaining a distinct political line. The MST argues that "unity in action" is an "obligation" to attract broader contingents of the Peronist social base towards the left, especially during moments of crisis and disillusionment with the Peronist political apparatus. They emphasize that the March 24th demonstration, despite its broad appeal, maintained its independence "of the State and of all political power" by articulating a clear message that called for Milei and Bullrich to leave, demanded the opening of archives from 1974, and denounced the FMI and the debt. This suggests that for the MST, broad unity does not necessarily equate to co-optation or the dilution of revolutionary principles, provided the front maintains a clear, independent political message.
This polemic is not merely an internal dispute but a concrete, contemporary manifestation of the theoretical and practical dilemmas inherent in united front strategies. It directly illustrates the core tensions between:
Unity vs. Purity: The MST advocates for broad unity to attract mass layers, even from the Peronist base, viewing it as essential for effective resistance. In contrast, the PTS is accused of prioritizing a "purer" revolutionary line, potentially fearing co-optation or dilution of its principles through broad alliances.
Tactic vs. Strategy: The MST views the March 24th action as a crucial tactic to strike a blow against Milei and build influence among the masses. They accuse the PTS of allowing narrow electoral calculations to undermine this tactical unity for broader class struggle.
Leadership and Hegemony: The dispute over who leads lists within FIT-U and the fundamental character of the front (whether it is an exclusively electoral platform or a vehicle for building a unified revolutionary party) reflects a deeper struggle for political hegemony and influence within the revolutionary left.
Such fundamental disagreements, particularly within a formal front like FIT-U, suggest ongoing instability and recurring internal conflict. The effectiveness of the united front as a tool for revolutionary change will be consistently hampered unless these strategic divergences are resolved or managed through robust internal democratic processes, as the MST proposes for FIT-U. The polemic reveals that the how of unity—its boundaries, leadership, and purpose—is as contentious and critical as the why—the imperative to oppose Milei.
Furthermore, when the MST accuses the PTS of "sectarianism," it is not merely a pejorative but a precise strategic critique. The MST argues that the PTS's actions, such as sabotaging a broad unity mobilization or prioritizing narrow electoral gains or internal organizational control over mass action, constitute an "erroneous attitude to the class struggle." This critique implies that the PTS's approach undermines the potential for mass mobilization and influence against the Milei government, aligning with the theoretical understanding of sectarianism as abstentionism from actual class struggle or prioritizing narrow organizational interests over broader class unity. The use of such terms, while polemical, points to deep ideological and methodological rifts within the revolutionary left. It indicates that the challenge for the Argentine left is not just external, stemming from the Milei government's offensive, but also profoundly internal: how to achieve tactical flexibility and broad unity without succumbing to perceived opportunism, while also avoiding the isolation that comes from a rigid adherence to a "pure" line. The polemic reveals a struggle over the very definition of revolutionary effectiveness and the correct path to building a mass alternative in the current conjuncture.
The analysis of Corriente Marabunta's stated principles and the concrete PTS-MST polemic reveals a pervasive and fundamental tension within the Argentine revolutionary left: the imperative for broad unity against common threats, such as the Milei government, versus the crucial need to maintain political and organizational independence. Corriente Marabunta's recent affiliation with the Fourth International inherently implies an internationalist perspective and a commitment to learning from global experiences. The Fourth International's structure explicitly allows for "confrontation of analyses and experiences of militants from different countries" - a formalized process for drawing international lessons and refining tactical approaches. This global perspective is crucial for understanding the complexities of united front dynamics, as it allows for the integration of lessons from varied historical and contemporary struggles across regions.
In essence, the Argentine revolutionary left continues to grapple with the enduring challenge of finding the correct balance between unity and purity, and between tactic and strategy. While the external threat from the Milei government necessitates collective action, internal ideological and methodological divergences persistently complicate the formation and sustainability of effective united fronts. The ongoing polemics, while superficially divisive, also serve as a critical, albeit often acrimonious, forum for clarifying these strategic choices and ideological lines, shaping the future trajectory of the left's resistance and its pursuit of a revolutionary alternative in Argentina.
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