The Revolutionary Organisation in the Doldrums: Learning from Lutte Ouvrière (LO) and the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR)
Avoiding the Siren Song of the Sect
For revolutionary organisations operating in prolonged periods without a generalised revolutionary upsurge, the question of survival and continued relevance becomes paramount. It is often observed that in such times, cut off from the dynamism of mass movements, these groups face significant challenges. Some socialists, reflecting on this difficulty, might feel that a sect-like stance is unavoidable, or perhaps even a desirable, necessary evil to preserve theoretical "purity" or a revolutionary core against the tide of reformism and adaptation. This perspective might view isolation not as a failure, but as a necessary condition for maintaining ideological integrity in a hostile environment, with some suggesting that "every revolutionary organisation, absent a revolutionary upsurge, will degenerate into a sect given 30 years or so."
However, drawing on historical experience and theoretical insights, particularly from the early Communist International and key figures like Lenin and Trotsky, a powerful counter-strategy emerges: the united front tactic. Far from resigning revolutionary groups to sectarian isolation, the united front provides a solid, indeed essential, strategy for avoiding irrelevance and connecting with the working class. Leaders like Lenin cautioned against adopting a "sectarian attitude towards mass organisations and movements, particularly trade unions." The idea that the party could be conceived as a selection purely on a theoretical plane, rather than an avant-garde forged in class struggle, is also mentioned in contrast to engagement with mass organisations like trade unions. These perspectives underline the historical recognition that isolation from the broader working class is a significant threat.
The period following the May '68 events in France, while a significant upheaval, transitioned into a non-revolutionary phase. Both Lutte Ouvrière (LO) and the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR, earlier the Ligue Communiste) operated within this same objective situation. Despite sharing this context, their approaches and "lived realities" differed significantly, demonstrating that the outcome—sectarianism or continued engagement—was not predetermined by objective conditions alone.
Lutte Ouvrière's Approach: The "Comfort Zone"
Lutte Ouvrière is presented as holding a "Manichaean" view, separating a petit-bourgeois "gauchiste" movement from a "proletarian tendency." Post-May '68, LO had a particular weight among far-left groups due to having older and more advanced worker implantation than others, primarily based in student milieus. This relative strength in a specific area seems to have contributed to a "comfort zone" for LO.
LO's proposals for unity often appeared as tactical operations to reinforce their own "proletarian tendency." They saw themselves as a "newspaper," a "tendency," or "experienced militants," not explicitly "the" revolutionary party. Their approach often focused on intervening in struggles where their militants were present, drawing lessons from these specific instances rather than starting from large-scale mobilisations or the political lines of major unions or the government. For example, an article discussing a strike failure in Sud-Aviation Toulouse implied that workers should take matters into their own hands, appearing to place the onus on the workers rather than analysing the role of union leadership or offering a political alternative. Another example shows them focusing on company examples where their militants intervened, rather than major struggles of the period. They also seemed to exhibit a certain passivity, criticising the actions of other groups without proposing alternative political lines.
LO's international work is limited to occasional meetings and articles, lacking serious effort in mass work or concrete construction of revolutionary groups abroad. Their internal functioning, characterised by a lack of congresses or formal tendencies, relying on "permanent debate" and a system of political formation leading to conformism, is perhaps suited for a small sect but blocking for an organisation seeking broader influence. This reliance on a narrow base and particular methods, sometimes described as economism focusing on workplace issues without sufficient political leadership, could lead to a feeling of "impuissance" when faced with situations outside their direct control or a specific type of intervention, such as a crisis in a student union. Even in a vibrant setting like France after May '68, groups like LO could exhibit sectarian traits. Their focus remained heavily tied to their specific implantation and methods, sometimes leading to a "passivité critique" rather than proposing alternative political lines. The refusal of Leninism in the domain of organisation also led some groups with similar sensibilities to dissolution or isolation.
The Ligue's Approach: Engagement and United Front
In contrast, the Ligue Communiste was committed to constructing a revolutionary worker party in France as part of the Fourth International. The Ligue recognised the danger of sectarianism, defined as a "sectarian attitude towards mass organisations and movements, particularly trade unions." They understood that the party must be "forged in class struggle," not merely a theoretical selection.
The Ligue actively sought to overcome "isolation and lack of leadership of the masses" through action, understanding that millions would be convinced by action, not just propaganda. They saw the united front tactic as a crucial tool for preventing revolutionary groups from devolving into isolated sects, aiming to unify the working class through the action of its existing organisations, including trade unions.
For the Ligue, trade union activity was necessary, although not an end in itself for revolutionary militants. They distinguished between different reformist unions like the CGT and CFDT, advocating for intervention within them to combat reformist ideology, clarify debate, and address emerging revolutionary currents. Their approach involved intervening in significant social struggles, popularising them, and driving solidarity, recognising the decisive role a political organisation could play. They engaged in building enterprise cells and groups to disseminate revolutionary positions and intervene in struggles.
The Ligue was also involved in international work, actively participating in the construction of sections of the Fourth International and providing support to revolutionaries in the Third World. They engaged in joint campaigns and actions with other groups, including Lutte Ouvrière, seeking practical verification of common activity and the viability of a unified organisation. This willingness to engage in united action, even with groups they had differences with, contrasts with a sectarian approach that might refuse collaboration based on theoretical or organisational disagreements.
Resisting Sectarianism Beyond France
The record shows that sections of the Fourth International, operating in diverse and potentially more difficult conditions than France, used tactics like the united front, entrism (working within existing mass organisations), and revolutionary regroupment to resist sectarian marginalisation. While the specific context and challenges varied internationally, the strategic commitment to engaging with the working class and its existing organisations, rather than retreating into isolation, was seen as essential for survival and growth during non-revolutionary periods. The Ligue's own development, establishing cells in workplaces and groups to implement a policy of intervention, provides a concrete example of how revolutionary groups can build connections and resist isolation through active engagement in the class struggle.
Conclusion
In summary, while LO and the Ligue faced the same objective situation after May '68, their distinct political lines and organisational practices led to different paths. LO's focus on its specific base and methods, sometimes bordering on abstract propaganda or moralising rather than comprehensive political engagement, illustrates how a group can exhibit sectarian characteristics and risk isolation even in a context with potential for broader movement. The Ligue, conversely, by prioritising engagement with mass movements, utilising the united front tactic, and seeking regroupment, actively sought to counter the dangers of sectarianism and remain connected to the working-class struggle. This suggests that sectarianism is not an inevitable fate in the absence of a revolutionary upsurge, but rather a danger that can be resisted through conscious strategic and tactical choices aimed at active intervention in the class struggle.