Class Unity, the Working-Class United Front and the Allies of the Proletariat
1979 World Congress of the Fourth International
Unity of the proletariat, forged in action, must be at the heart of any strategy for a socialist revolution in the imperialist countries of Europe.
The unification of the key sectors of the proletariat—essentially, those in industry, transport, and communications—is the cornerstone of building such unity and of rallying the oppressed and exploited layers, those who have no objective interest in preserving private ownership of the major means of production, behind the cause of the working class.
An orientation calling for an alliance with the so-called middle classes on the basis of respecting private ownership of the means of production and the market economy, as is involved in a class collaborationist policy, creates division in the ranks of the wage earners. A section of these are impelled, even to defend their elementary demands, such as halting layoffs, to want to do away with capitalist ownership here and now.
Such workers tend immediately to refuse to subordinate their interests to the needs of an alliance with “antimonopoly sectors” of the bourgeoisie, or even with the; monopolist bourgeoisie itself, as is the case in the Italian “historic compromise.” The orientation of the reformists thus dampens their spirits, may discourage them, and keep them from winning more backward layers to their cause.
Other sections of the working class, which are not confronted with the same difficulties, do not have the same experience in struggle, and have not yet been won over to independent working-class action, may wait and see what the results of such a class-collaborationist policy are. But their expectations will be disappointed, with the resulting risks of an erosion of their forces.
Thus, any strategy of alliances on a conservative basis with “middle layers,” any class-collaborationist policy, introduces a dividing line into the working class itself. The unity of the workers is thus inextricably tied up with class independence.
Such strategies make the unity of the workers organizations and their leaderships a prior condition for any mobilization of the exploited and oppressed layers themselves for their demands. To the contrary, any real mass movement may serve as a catalyst in unifying the proletariat.
For example, if the unemployed are organized and led in struggle, this can inspire sections of the proletariat that are tending to be reduced to a precarious existence by the crisis with a confidence in their power. Along with this, such action can raise in the mass workers organizations the question of uniting the proletariat.
Moreover, if immigrant workers go into action in defense of their specific demands, this also provides a basis for raising the need for uniting the class, that is, for bringing the immigrants into a united battle line of the working class as a whole. In such mobilizations, we support demands and forms of action that facilitate a linkup with the workers movement.
Achieving an alliance with sections of the petty bourgeoisie-small shop keepers, small farmers, and artisans—remains an important problem for the workers. An alliance with the small peasants is a strategic, question first of all because of the social weight they wield in a series of countries (Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain, southern Italy, and certain regions of France). But it is a vital question also as a result of the role they play in supplying food to the urban complexes in most European countries.
It is necessary to convince the small peasants, artisans, and shopkeepers, many of whom are being expropriated by big capital, that the expropriation of the expropriators is not aimed at confiscating small property. What needs to be done is to show that a working-class plan for solutions to the crisis offers the means for meeting their own special needs.
In Portugal, among sections of the peasantry in the north, of the small shopkeepers, and artisans, the hope of getting long-term credit at very low interest rates as a result of the nationalization of the banks created a favorable attitude toward the nascent revolution for a period. The same reaction could be seen when the Portuguese petrochemical trust (SACOR) was nationalized under workers control, and the possibility appeared of its supplying fertilizer on unprecedentedly favorable credit terms.
Every means possible has to be used to demonstrate to these petty-bourgeois layers that there is no antagonism between workers control over the banks and industry, a monopoly of foreign trade, and setting up a unified banking system, on the one hand, and what is favorable to their interests. They look for distribution of the land, getting what is necessary to cultivate it (fertilizer, machinery), and easy credit terms. It is necessary also to demonstrate to the peasants, artisans, and small merchants that there is no contradiction between these first steps in setting up a planned economy and their enjoying favorable conditions for buying raw materials and distributing their products. This can encourage them to organize in cooperatives on a voluntary basis.
A series of working-class demands may also answer the most pressing needs of such petty-bourgeois layers—improving or establishing a genuine social welfare system, developing social and collective infrastructures (hospitals, housing, nurseries, etc.), education and vocational training in all fields (crafts, industry, agriculture).
Decisiveness on the part of the workers movement in providing positive answers to crucial socio-economic problems, such as the destruction of the environment, capitalist squandering of energy potential, the anarchy in scientific research and its subordination to the narrow needs of monopolies such as the military-industrial complex, and the threadbare system of public health can attract to the side of the workers sections of the “new middle layers of wage earners” (engineers, scientists, university teachers, and house physicians in hospitals, etc.)
In order to forge the unity of the working class in action and advance the proletariat along the road of class independence, the united front tactic assumes an important role.
The strategy of uniting the proletariat for the conquest of power must not be reduced to this tactic alone. This strategy requires a complex combination of actions and methods and slogans to go along with them. Nonetheless, the tactic of the workers united front assumes a special place today among the tasks to be pursued by the sections for the following reasons:
The economic offensive of the bourgeoisie.
The objective division that this offensive is creating in the working class, helped along by the bureaucratic apparatuses.
Growing violations of democratic rights.
The divisiveness engendered directly by the reformist leaderships on the trade-union and political levels.
The need for large-scale mobilizations to block the austerity policies of the governments and the bosses during which large sectors of the masses can test the validity of the alternative policy we put forward.
The urgent need to offer a rallying point for the struggles of the various social movements.
The united front tactic cannot be focused exclusively on agreements between the major organizations in the working class, Nonetheless, such accords are often decisive in mobilizing the class, since the new layers of the working class that are going into action insist on unity, an attitude they take in response to the attacks of the capitalists. This aspect of the united front takes on its greatest importance in those countries where the workers movement is split from top to bottom along party lines (SP, CP).
The united front at the top must not be counterposed to unity in action in various forms at the rank-and-file level or in specific sectors. What is important is to start from the objective needs of the working masses and to combine this activity with an orientation to the workers organizations, both at the top and at the bottom.
The Trotskyists do not take a wait-and-see attitude, making their initiatives de pendent on a prior agreement or under standing among the big workers organizations. By themselves, or together with other organizations, they can and must promote mobilizations. But in formulating slogans and selecting forms of action, they have to combine two objectives. One is to broaden the mobilization as much as possible by including, if feasible, activists and sections of the traditional organizations. The other is to maintain a united-front approach to these organizations, even when the chances of achieving any unity with them are slight.
Differentiations within the reformist parties, as well as changes in the relationship of forces between the apparatuses and the working-class vanguard may offer greater opportunities for the sections to formulate their proposals for unity in concrete terms on all the levels on which they raise them.
Depending on the relationship of forces and the concrete political situation, propaganda as well as agitation for a working class united front may be focused primarily on a united front between the big organizations of the working class on the national level—for example, united actions of the SP and the CP and the trade-union organizations led by them against an austerity plan.
We campaign constantly to explain our entire program to as broad an audience as possible, posing it as an alternative to the program of the reformist leaderships.
But this is not enough to win broad layers of workers away from the influence of the reformists or even of the centrists. Only experience in action can raise the consciousness of major sections of the working class. This enables them to see in practice what an obstacle the reformist policy represents to the advancement of the movement in which they are involved.
Of course, we do not make acceptance of our program a condition for establishing a united front. We base our united-front initiatives on the tasks flowing from the needs of the masses, which are dictated by the objective situation. To this end, we put forward immediate, democratic, or transitional demands that offer a basis for the unity in action of the masses and the organizations of the workers movement both in the plants and outside. At the same time, we campaign to get the workers organizations to break with the bourgeoisie. This can take different forms, depending on the country and the situation. We may focus on the need to break with a bourgeois party, oppose restrictions on the right to strike, oppose participation (by the unions or workers parties) in labor management boards, etc. Although such a break from the bourgeoisie cannot be complete except on the basis of the revolutionary program and although the Trotskyists explain this publicly, they do not make adopting the revolutionary program a precondition for movements going in this direction.
In the framework of this battle for unifying the working class and achieving its political independence, we maintain the need for building a revolutionary party to facilitate united action by the masses and to make it easier for them to take the initiative on the political level. The united-front tactic is not an end in itself, but a means for mobilizing the masses, for winning influence over them, and wresting them away from the domination of the reformist leaderships. Our objective remains the advancement of united, broad, and militant mass mobilizations, democratically organized and led.
The highest form of such class unity is embodied in the setting up, extension, and coordination of councils and committees. When this is achieved, the power of the ruling class on the governmental and state level will in fact be put in question.